Markets generation

Introduciendo el "vote escrow token" del $GT3 como turborizador de otros mercados

xGT3 supports the entire fee generation dynamic. It goes beyond being just a synthetic token and incorporates veToken functionalities. A "vote escrow token" (veToken) is a type of non-fungible token (NFT) that grants governance rights over liquidity decisions within the protocol.

In our case, we assign this utility to xGT3. Unlike a simple synthetic token, xGT3 is designed to increase the protocol's real liquidity, not just distribute fees based on its holders.

1. Creation of new pools governed by xGT3 holders

We envision a scenario where GT3 acts as a catalyst to help listed projects gain more TVL and retain more value through liquidity systems that combine veTokens mechanisms developed by Curve with economic models (3,3) that originated from OlympusDAO. The hybrid model we are inspired by (the famous ve(3,3)) was proposed by Andre Cronje in Solidly, with some recent modifications. Therefore, in GT3, we will have pools linked to other tokens, such as the following:

The goal is to generate two liquidity pools for each third-party project (e.g., Reental and its RNT token): one linked to GT3 (e.g., RNT-GT3) and another linked to a stable or volatile pair (e.g., RNT-WBTC).
Any project will be happy for its token to become more liquid, as creating these pools forces the market to buy more tokens and lock them in the form of LP. Therefore, these pools always benefit the project that decides to work with GT3.
The xGT3 holders will decide which pools receive the monthly incentives from the vault, thereby increasing the projected APRs for the next cycle.
At the same time, any project can add profitability during the cycle, thus increasing the APR for the GT3 lockers and further incentivizing LPs to provide liquidity during that cycle (by increasing the voting from GT3 lockers towards the protocol’s liquidity pools).
In this way, projects can allocate token packages (measured in $) monthly to xGT3 holders who vote for them as a marketing strategy with direct and measurable ROI within the same cycle.
This will cause GT3 liquidity to grow exponentially, both from xGT3 holders (who need to lock GT3 to vote and receive incentives and commissions) and from LPs (who provide additional liquidity in many other pools, whether dependent on GT3 or not).
Incentives in this model are aligned, as both LPs (receiving the tokenomic GT3 incentives allocated to them) and xGT3 holders (receiving fees generated by the pools they voted for, plus incentives from the projects) benefit.

This model radically changes how we understand $GT3 and aligns us more with the mission and vision of the company as drivers of the crypto and Web3 ecosystem, with multiple successful projects. Through this model, we can help listed tokens capture value and grow in liquidity by aligning incentives around $GT3. Visually,

Users with GT3 choose to generate xGT3 to gain voting power over the protocol’s liquidity decisions. This creates the GT3 lockers, and the cycle begins.

In each cycle (30 days), each GT3 locker decides, based on its voting power, which pools it wants to allocate the vault’s incentives to.
Projects reward the GT3 lockers who vote for their pools: game theory suggests that these lockers will vote for the pools whose projects offer better incentives (or where the lockers themselves have more exposure).
Pools that gain more voting power will have a higher APR, as they will receive more GT3 from the incentive vault during that cycle.
Liquidity Providers (LPs) decide which pools to allocate their liquidity to based on certain variables (APR, tokens held, etc.). Game theory suggests that LP holders will provide more liquidity to the pools where they can receive the most incentives.
Since the pools will have higher volume and liquidity—even more than the original projects' DAPPs—they will offer better prices to traders, thus reducing the price impact per trade.
This trading volume generates more fees, of which 85% will go to xGT3 holders.
The DAO treasury becomes self-sustaining, receiving 15% of the commissions in each cycle and being able to continue incentivizing GT3 in each cycle so that LP holders keep supporting their pools.

PreviousFees generation NextHolding strategies on GT3

Last updated 1 month ago

1. Creation of new pools governed by xGT3 holders

The goal is to generate two liquidity pools for each third-party project (e.g., Reental and its RNT token): one linked to GT3 (e.g., RNT-GT3) and another linked to a stable or volatile pair (e.g., RNT-WBTC).

Any project will be happy for its token to become more liquid, as creating these pools forces the market to buy more tokens and lock them in the form of LP. Therefore, these pools always benefit the project that decides to work with GT3.

The xGT3 holders will decide which pools receive the monthly incentives from the vault, thereby increasing the projected APRs for the next cycle.

At the same time, any project can add profitability during the cycle, thus increasing the APR for the GT3 lockers and further incentivizing LPs to provide liquidity during that cycle (by increasing the voting from GT3 lockers towards the protocol’s liquidity pools).

In this way, projects can allocate token packages (measured in $) monthly to xGT3 holders who vote for them as a marketing strategy with direct and measurable ROI within the same cycle.

This will cause GT3 liquidity to grow exponentially, both from xGT3 holders (who need to lock GT3 to vote and receive incentives and commissions) and from LPs (who provide additional liquidity in many other pools, whether dependent on GT3 or not).

Incentives in this model are aligned, as both LPs (receiving the tokenomic GT3 incentives allocated to them) and xGT3 holders (receiving fees generated by the pools they voted for, plus incentives from the projects) benefit.

Users with GT3 choose to generate xGT3 to gain voting power over the protocol’s liquidity decisions. This creates the GT3 lockers, and the cycle begins.

In each cycle (30 days), each GT3 locker decides, based on its voting power, which pools it wants to allocate the vault’s incentives to.

Projects reward the GT3 lockers who vote for their pools: game theory suggests that these lockers will vote for the pools whose projects offer better incentives (or where the lockers themselves have more exposure).

Pools that gain more voting power will have a higher APR, as they will receive more GT3 from the incentive vault during that cycle.

Liquidity Providers (LPs) decide which pools to allocate their liquidity to based on certain variables (APR, tokens held, etc.). Game theory suggests that LP holders will provide more liquidity to the pools where they can receive the most incentives.

Since the pools will have higher volume and liquidity—even more than the original projects' DAPPs—they will offer better prices to traders, thus reducing the price impact per trade.

This trading volume generates more fees, of which 85% will go to xGT3 holders.

The DAO treasury becomes self-sustaining, receiving 15% of the commissions in each cycle and being able to continue incentivizing GT3 in each cycle so that LP holders keep supporting their pools.